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The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of corruption on bank lending in 
Russia. This issue is of major interest in order to understand the causes of financial 
underdevelopment and the effects of corruption in Russia. We use regional measures 
of corruption and bank-level data to perform this investigation. Our main estimations 
show that corruption hampers bank lending in Russia. We investigate whether this 
negative role of corruption is influenced by the degree of bank risk aversion, but find 
no effect. The detrimental effect of corruption is only observed for loans to 
households and firms, in opposition to loans to government.  Additional controls 
confirm the detrimental impact of corruption on bank lending. Therefore, our results 
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“The doctor keeps talking, talking but his eyes keep darting, darting to my fist – wondering if I’ll give 
him a crisp blue-colored bill.” 




The  evidence of corruption in Russia  is difficult to refute. Transparency 
International’s 2007 Corruption Perception Index ranked Russia 143
rd out of the 179 
countries surveyed, making it the second-most corrupt country in Europe after 
Belarus.  Confounding the scholarly intuition that  the  corruption  that  has plagued 
Russia since Chekhov’s time should decline with economic prosperity (Shleifer and 
Treisman, 2000), it appears instead  that  corruption  has thrived unabated  during 
Russia’s recent economic resurgence.
2
While corruption in courts  is expected to have a negative  impact on bank 
lending, the role of corruption in lending is not straightforward. It can be considered 
as a financing obstacle, as it acts as a tax that increases the cost of the loan to the 
borrower. However, while the latter argument assumes that the bribe is required by 
the bank official, the borrower may take the initiative to propose a bribe to enhance 
his chances to obtain a loan. Furthermore, the impact of corruption on bank lending 
may vary with the type of borrowers, and corruption may consequently influence the 
breakdown of bank lending between types of borrowers. Thus, we might well ask 
 Levin and Satarov (2000, p.113) conclude that 
corruption in Russia is an endemic phenomenon that has “become a commonplace 
theme in discussions of the Russian economy.” 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of corruption on bank lending 
in Russia. Our hypothesis is that a high level of corruption discourages banks from 
engaging in lending. Greater corruption adds to uncertainty of judicial decisions for 
banks, as they cannot count on the courts to enforce damages recoveries for losses or 
deficiency judgments against defaulting debtors, and consequently banks are expected 
to refrain from lending. However corruption is not limited to the misuse of public 
office as underlined by its common definition provided by Transparency 
International: “the misuse of entrusted power for private gain”. It can also take place 
in lending through bribes given to bank officials to receive a loan, as observed by 
Levin and Satarov (2000) in Russia. 
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whether corruption, associated with ill-functioning institutions, exerts the same 
influence on bank lending to government entities as to other borrowers. We examine 
these issues using data on corruption in 40 Russian regions from the Transparency 
International  (TI)  and Information for Democracy Foundation (INDEM)  survey 
conducted in 2002. Detailed data on banks are drawn from the Interfax database. 
Our work then contributes to understand the causes of financial development 
and of the effects of corruption in Russia, i.e. both fundamental issues for the 
economic development of the country. First, bank lending remains stunningly low 
with a ratio of domestic credit to GDP equal to 25.7% in 2005, compared to a world 
average of 55.8% (EBRD, 2006). Given that a positive relationship between bank 
lending and growth has long been noted in the literature (e.g. Levine and Zervos, 
1998; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000), the need for investigating the determinants of 
bank lending in Russia is self-evident. We ask, therefore, how endemic corruption has 
played a role in stunting development of bank lending in Russia. 
Second, as notably observed by Shleifer and Treisman (2000), there is a 
commonly accepted view that corruption hampers economic development in Russia, 
which relies on the cross-country studies showing the  detrimental effects of 
corruption on economic development (Mauro, 1995; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). Yet 
this consensus has  emerged in the absence of studies that actually establish and 
specify the detriments of corruption in Russia
3
Next to its relevance for Russia, this study brings also significant insights for 
several strands of literature. By focusing on the impact on bank lending, it analyzes an 
unexplored effect of corruption. Indeed, in spite of the growing  literature on 
corruption, no study has ever studied the impact of corruption on bank lending. This 
work also relates to studies investigating the role of legal institutions on the size of 
credit markets at the macro level (La Porta et al., 1997; Djankov, McLiesh and 
Shleifer, 2007) and the micro level (Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2006). While these 
papers point out the role of legal origin, creditor rights, and law enforcement, we 
. Moreover, economic boom in the 
midst of persistent corruption calls into question directly the notion that corruption per 
se constitutes an obstacle to economic growth. Thus, closer scrutiny is needed to 
assess the detrimental economic effects of corruption in Russia. 
                                                         
3 The sole exception to our knowledge is the study of Safavian, Graham and Gonzalez-Vega (2001), 
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extend this literature by investigating the role of corruption and by proceeding to a 
single-country study. 
This national framework is of utmost interest to appraise the economic effects 
of corruption on bank lending. A cross-country analysis suffers from the drawback of 
mixing the effects of corruption with country-level variables such as legal origin, laws 
in the books, or culture. Indeed several studies have shown the relationship between 
corruption and legal variables (La Porta et al., 1997) and the role of culture on 
corruption (Treisman, 2000). The use of a national framework allows for teasing out 
of specific economic effects of corruption on bank lending. Indeed, Svensson (2005) 
discusses the econometric problems in cross-country analyses of the effects of 
corruption resulting from omitted variables. Our single-country framework is not 
subject to these constraints. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents evidence 
and literature on corruption in Russia. Section III develops the arguments on the role 
of corruption on bank lending. Section IV presents the data and variables and section 
V considers the results. Concluding remarks appear in section VI. 
 
II. Corruption in Russia 
 
In reviewing corruption of the judiciary, Blass (2007) describes the Russian 
court system as a “supine, underpaid judiciary, ill-equipped to withstand corruptive 
practices and the influence of economic or political interests.” While this situation 
appears to be changing slowly, thanks in part to reforms implemented during Putin’s 
presidency (e.g. higher salaries for judges), INDEM figures suggest corruption of the 
courts remains high. The perceived average cost of obtaining justice in a Russian 
court  was  9,570 rubles (US$  358)  in 2005. Furthermore, the share of citizens 
encountering corruption situations when seeking justice through the courts was 39.5% 
(INDEM, 2005).  In an interview with Izvestia  (October 25, 2004), Constitutional 
Court  chairman, Valery Zorkin, bleakly observed,  “Bribe-taking in the courts has 
become one of the biggest corruption markets in Russia.” 
Corruption in bank  lending  entered the public consciousness with the well-
publicized September 2006 assassination of Andrei Kozlov, the first deputy chairman 
of the  Central Bank of Russia in charge of fighting  against corruption, money 
laundering and other abuses in the Russian banking industry. Corruption in lending   - 5 -  - 
 
 
practices appears to be supported by a wide array of elements. Levin and Satarov 
(2000) describe how in the 1990s borrowers gave envelopes filled with cash to bank 
officials and then present the figures for criminal cases actually prosecuted against 
employees of Russian banks. In April 2008, the Central Bank of Russia took a new 
tack in fighting corruption in lending by publishing a blacklist of bank managers sued 
for criminal account and civil liability (Kommersant,  April 2, 2008).  The World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES) of the World Bank, carried out between end-
1998 and mid-2000, also dealt with this form of corruption in its cross-country survey 
of firm managers on the possible role of corruption of bank officials as an obstacle for 
the growth of business. Our computations, which are based on the WBES sample of 
363 Russian firm managers, show that 26.72% considered that corruption of bank 
officials to be a major or moderate obstacle to business at the time of the survey. It 
must be stressed that these figures are similar to those observed in other regions of the 
world. Indeed, Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2004) use the survey findings to show 
that 20–30% of firms in non-OECD countries consider corruption of bank officials a 
major or moderate obstacle to their businesses. 
Given the strong evidence of corruption’s significance in Russia, the dearth of 
academic papers on the topic is somewhat surprising. Levin and Satarov (2000) lay 
out the different forms of corruption manifested in the 1990s, underlining the critical 
role of institutions in their persistence. Safavian, Graham and Gonzalez-Vega (2001) 
investigate of the role of corruption in the growth of microenterprises. Their ground-
breaking work is based on a survey of 304 microenterprises in Samara area in which 
managers were asked to provide information on the characteristics of their firm and on 
their perception of corruption. They find that firms were not affected uniformly by 
corruption (i.e. larger and more successful companies were more tolerant of bribery) 
and that corruption was detrimental to corporate growth. 
Dininio and Orttung (2005) investigate the determinants of corruption by using 
a measure of corruption based on the amount of bribes from the TI/INDEM dataset. 
They test several theories for the variation in corruption across Russian regions. This 
involves considering such variables as economic development, presence of natural 
resources, institutions, and size of government measured  by the number of 
bureaucrats. Only two variables, per capita income and the number of bureaucrats, are 
found  significant  in  explaining  corruption.  Mokhtari and  Grafova (2007) show  a 
negative association between corruption among tax office  employees  and  tax   - 6 -  - 
 
 
collection in Russia. They develop a model on the motivation of corrupt tax inspectors 
to accept bribes. They empirically test this prediction and show that increasing the 
number of tax inspection employees reduces per capita tax collection. 
In their description of the Russian transition, Shleifer and Treisman (2000) use a 
cross-country analysis  on the determinants of corruption from Treisman (2000) to 
comment the causes of corruption in Russia.
4
This section presents the elements from the literature on the effects of 
corruption on bank lending. The key argument that corruption should be expected to 
hamper bank lending is based on the law and finance theory pioneered by La Porta et 
al. (1997). Legal institutions protecting banks and enforcing contracts are likely to 
encourage greater bank lending by increasing the willingness of banks to grant loans. 
In  the  case of borrower  default, the bank may wish to force repayment, to grab 
collateral or even in some cases to take control of the borrower in case of a corporate 
 They observe that per capita income, 
federal structure, and the lack of exposure to democracy and free trade best explain 
corruption in Russia. From this, they infer cultural  and  historical factors are not 
relevant to explaining the extent of corruption in Russia. In other words, they do not 
see corruption in Russia as intrinsic to the country. These observations lead them to 
conclude that corruption  “is likely to diminish –  though slowly  –  the longer the 
country remains  democratic and open to trade,”  and also that it “should fall if 
economic growth returns” (p.104). Regarding the consequences of corruption, they 
claim corruption “is not a sufficient explanation for the country’s failure to grow” 
(p.105), and give several historical examples of rapid growth in corrupt countries. 
Their argument is somewhat finessed: they do not say corruption is not detrimental to 
growth, rather they suggest that the detrimental effects of corruption may sometimes 
be insufficient to overwhelm positive influences from other determinants of growth. 
In summary, we note that while the presence of corruption in courts and lending 
in Russia  is acknowledged, there has been little investigation  into  the economic 
consequences of this phenomenon. By analyzing the role of corruption on bank 
lending in Russia, we start to fill this gap in our understanding. 
 
III. Linkages of corruption and bank lending 
 
                                                         
4 See also Goel and Nelson (2008) and Goel (2008) for cross-country investigations on the causes of 
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loan. Therefore, the institutions that empower the bank to proceed to these actions 
exert an influence on its lending behavior. As corruption adds to uncertainty for banks 
to enforce their claims against defaulting borrowers, it diminishes the willingness of 
banks to grant loans. 
Empirical evidence supports the role of laws on the books and law enforcement 
on bank lending. While La Porta et al. (1997) observe that better legal protection for 
creditors  contributes  to larger debt markets, Levine (1998, 1999) and Djankov, 
McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) show that better legal protection for lenders is associated 
with increased levels of bank lending. In a cross-country investigation at the loan 
level, Qian and Strahan (2007) provide support for this view with the finding that 
stronger protection for borrowers on the books depresses lending. 
The arguments above  share a common presumption that corruption hampers 
bank lending. But might not corruption in lending be beneficial in some cases? For 
example, when the borrower bribes  the bank official to enhance his chances of 
obtaining a loan, corruption encourages banks to lend. Thus, corruption greases the 
wheels of the banking industry, or as the Russians say, “one hand washes the other.”
5
Several transition country scholars note the role of corruption in encouraging 
bank lending. In Russia, Levin and Satarov (2000, p. 115) observe that corruption can 
take place through “providing a credit from a commercial bank in exchange for a 
bribe.” In the Czech Republic, Lizal and Kocenda (2001, p.150) mention that “in the 
banking sector, corruption is associated with the provision of loans for unreasonable 
or even non-existent projects.” This remark is in line with the view that some loans 
 
A theoretical argument can also be advanced to support this positive impact of 
corruption in lending. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have shown that adverse selection, 
resulting from ex ante information asymmetry between the bank and the borrower, 
causes credit rationing (i.e. loan applications from borrowers willing to pay more than 
the loan rate charged by the bank are rejected). The bank is motivated to do so to 
avoid adverse selection that results in attracting only bad borrowers. Nevertheless, the 
existence of credit rationing suggests that some borrowers are willing to pay more 
than the official loan rate to obtain credit. As a consequence, they have incentive to 
bribe bank officials to obtain the loan. 
                                                         
5 Bardhan (1997, p.1323) points out the terminological distinction in Russian between “mzdoimstvo, 
taking a remuneration to do what you are supposed to do anyway, and likhoimstvo, taking a 
remuneration for what you are not supposed to do.”   - 8 -  - 
 
 
may have been granted following bribes given by borrowers to obtain a loan. 
Furthermore,  our own computations on the WBES dataset for  Russia show that 
58.13% of Russian firm managers did not perceive corruption of bank officials as an 
obstacle to the growth of their business.  
From an empirical perspective, the only paper to our knowledge providing 
estimations on the role of corruption on bank lending is the investigation of 
Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008) into the role of foreign bank penetration on 
bank credit. This work considers corruption as a control variable and finds a negative 
association with bank credit. 
 
IV. Data and variables 
 
We describe our measures of corruption and our bank-level variables in turn. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables. 
 
IV.1 Corruption data 
To measure corruption, we use the survey conducted by Transparency 
International and the Information for Democracy Foundation to measure differences 
in corruption levels across Russia in 2002.
6
The measure for perception is consistent with the Transparency International 
CPI score, which is widely used in cross-country comparisons and empirical studies 
(e.g. Lambsdorff, 2003; Méon and Sekkat, 2005). At first glance the measure based 
 The two organizations gathered during 
July and August 2002 comments from 5,666 individuals and 1,838 entrepreneurs 
representing small and medium-sized businesses in 40 Russian regions. The survey 
includes questions related to both perceptions and personal experiences with 
corruption.  The  dataset is unique in that it provides  corruption measures at the 
regional level for Russia. 
We use two measures from this survey to assess corruption in our estimations: 
the integral index for the perception of corruption (Perception), and the integral index 
for the amount of corruption (Amount), which asks people how much money they give 
in bribes. Both indices assign 0 to the region with the smallest level of corruption and 
1 to the region with the highest level of corruption. 
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on amount of bribes seems to have greater objectivity, since it is based on experience 
and  potentially could provide more reliable information  than mere perception. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to verify the accuracy of the amounts reported. The 
initiators of the project note  that while “assessment questions do not trouble 
respondents, who eagerly answer such questions (…), respondents hesitate to answer 
questions on corruption practices” (Transparency International and INDEM, 2002, 
p.1). Moreover, while both measures of corruption have a positive and significant 
correlation, the coefficient of correlation is not as high as one might expect (0.33). As 
the indices complement each other, we test both in our investigation. 
The survey contains information on corruption for 40 of Russia’s 89 regions. 
This incomplete coverage is not a major limitation for our study, as these 40 regions 
included 82.5% of Russian banks. Measures of corruption by region are presented in 
the Appendix. 
 
IV.2 Bank-level data and control variables 
We obtain quarterly bank-level data from the financial information agency 
Interfax. As we have information on corruption for Russian regions only for 2002, we 
use the four quarters of 2002 for the sample period. Our sample is composed of 3,825 
observations  for 1,009 banks.  The Russian banking industry is particularly 
fragmented, with 1,329 banks in 2002 (EBRD, 2006), of  which 37 were foreign-
owned and 27 were publicly-owned.
7
                                                         
7 Descriptions of the Russian banking industry can be found in Vernikov (2007), Karas, Schoors and 
Weill (2008), and Barisitz (2008). 
 
Following Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2006), bank lending is measured by the 
logarithm of total customer loans, i.e. all loans except interbank loans. We take the 
impact of changes in law on the lending behavior,  measured  by this variable, in 
transition countries. We use bank-level control variables to take bank characteristics 
into account. The ratio of deposits to total assets (Deposits to Assets) is controlled in 
the estimations, as sources of financing can influence the lending behavior of the 
bank. We also account for the size of the bank (Size), measured by the logarithm of 
total assets as the activities of small and big banks may differ. Age is the number of 
quarters since the creation of the bank. Ownership is controlled with dummy variables 
for public ownership (Public) and foreign ownership (Foreign).   - 10 -  - 
 
 
We also use two region-level variables to control for the environment. Bank 
Concentration is the Herfindahl index of regional bank concentration for loans,
8
Most control variables are significant. The positive sign for Size results most 
likely  from the fact that bigger  banks grant more loans. Deposits to Assets has a 
negative sign, suggesting that banks relying more on deposits are not as aggressive at 
lending. Age is positive in all estimations, but only significant when regional variables 
are not included. This tends to show that older banks lend more, which is in line with 
the role of long-term  relationships  between banks and borrowers  to reduce 
information asymmetries in the loan relationship (Sharpe, 1990).  The dummy 
 and 
computed from our dataset. Per Capita Income is the logarithm of Gross Regional 
product per capita, controlling for economic development. Data are obtained from the 
Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat).  Dummy variables for each quarter are 




This section presents our results for the impact of corruption on bank lending. 
We  start with the main estimations, and then look at whether  bank risk aversion 
influences the relationship between corruption and bank lending. Next, we consider 
corruption effects for various borrower groups. Finally, we perform some robustness 
check tests. 
 
V.1 Main estimations 
We perform regressions of bank lending on a set of variables, including a 
measure of corruption.  We use alternatively both measures of corruption and two 
combinations of control variables (with and without the region-level control variables) 
to check the sensitivity of the results. These results are displayed in Table 2. 
The key finding is the negative coefficient of Corruption, which is significant at 
1% level. This result is observed  when the corruption variable is Perception  or 
Amount, which shows that it is not dependent on the measure of corruption. It is 
robust to the set of control variables as the presence of the regional control variables 
does not affect this finding. The indication is that corruption hampers bank lending. 
                                                         
8 Results are similar with the Herfindahl index for assets.    - 11 -  - 
 
 
variables for foreign and public ownership are both significantly negative. Controlling 
for the size and age of the bank, this finding indicates foreign and public banks lend 
less than domestic private banks. 
Bank Concentration  is not significant,  suggesting  that  bank lending is not 
influenced by the degree of concentration of the banking industry. Finally, Per Capita 
Income is significantly negative, which is in line with the view that greater economic 
development negatively influences bank lending. This may appear counter-intuitive at 
first glance, given that the literature on the finance-growth nexus generally finds a 
positive association between economic and financial development (e.g. Levine and 
Zervos, 1998). Yet this depressing effect on lending is widely observed at the country 
level when we perform bank-level estimations.  Of course, this finding  could be 
intrinsic to Russia, making it hard to compare against studies elsewhere. To our best 
knowledge, no other studies have investigated the finance-growth nexus on Russian 
data. 
 
V.2 The impact of risk aversion of banks 
Even if corruption hampers bank lending, it is not clear that this effect is 
sensitive to the degree of bank risk aversion. Indeed corruption may be initiated by the 
borrower willing to enhance his chances to obtain a loan. One would expect to find 
this behavior more commonplace when banks display greater risk aversion, i.e. are 
more reluctant to grant loans. Indeed this reluctance  diminishes the chances of 
obtaining a loan for the borrower and motivates him to offer a bribe. Therefore, even 
if the overall effect of corruption on bank lending is detrimental, we need to determine 
whether it is weakened by the presence of greater risk aversion on the part of banks. 
To investigate this, we turn to a second set of estimations of the risk aversion of 
banks. Risk aversion is measured by the difference between the value of the capital 
adequacy ratio (N1) and the requirement for this ratio. Capital adequacy ratio is 
defined as the ratio of the bank’s equity capital to the overall risk-weighted assets 
minus the sum of the reserves created for depreciation of securities and possible 
losses. The minimum level of this ratio required by banking regulation depends on the 
amount of the bank’s equity: in 2002, the requirements were 10% for banks with 
equity above €5 million, and 11% for other banks. While a few studies use the ratio of 
equity to total assets as a measure of risk aversion of banks (e.g. Maudos and 
Fernandez de Guevara, 2004), we believe our measure of risk aversion is better as it   - 12 -  - 
 
 
takes into account the capital held in excess of regulatory capital and the different 
risk-weighted assets. 
We add a variable for bank risk aversion and an interaction term between 
corruption and the degree of bank  risk aversion.  The overall coefficient of the 
corruption index is the sum of the coefficient for Corruption and the coefficient for 
the interaction term Corruption  ×  Risk Aversion  multiplied by the value of Risk 
Aversion. Thus, if the negative effect of corruption on bank lending is weakened in 
the presence of greater bank risk aversion, we expect that when Corruption  is 
significantly negative, the interaction term Corruption × Risk Aversion is significantly 
positive. 
The results of these  estimations are displayed in Table 3. Note  that the 
coefficient of Corruption  is  negative  even if it only remains significant when the 
measure of corruption based on amount is used. Furthermore, the coefficient of Risk 
Aversion is significantly negative, which jives with the intuitive view that risk-averse 
banks lend less. We do not, however, find that the interaction term Corruption × Risk 
Aversion is significantly positive. This finding supports the view that the negative 
impact of corruption on bank lending is not influenced by the degree of bank risk 
aversion. In other words, the hypothesis that corruption may be less detrimental on 
bank lending by relaxing the reluctance of banks to grant loans is not supported. 
 
V.3 Estimations by category of loans 
We now ask whether  corruption may affect  different groups of borrowers 
differently, and even favor some borrowers over others. 
Specifically, we test the assumption that corruption is less detrimental for 
lending to government entities than other borrowers. This assumption is based on two 
mechanisms.  
First, corruption should exert an impact on bank lending by increasing the 
uncertainty of banks about enforcing their claims against defaulting borrowers. 
Therefore, this effect is expected to play a greater role for borrowers when the degree 
of information asymmetries is higher from the bank’s perspective. As observed by 
Haselmann and Wachtel (2006), these asymmetries should be weaker when banks 
lend money to government entities than to other borrowers as the ability of the 
government to tax means a lower default risk, which, in turn, leads to lower   - 13 -  - 
 
 
requirements for the bank to gather information. Thus, we expect a weaker 
detrimental effect of corruption on bank lending to government entities.  
Second, corruption is associated with institutional inefficiencies, so we ask 
whether corruption also exerts an impact on loans to government entities through 
public pressure to satisfy their financing needs. Our dataset allows such investigation 
as it includes information on loans by borrower  type: households, firms, and 
government (i.e. federal, regional and local entities). 
We rerun our estimations considering the logarithm of each category of loans as 
the explained variable. The results appear in Table 4 (Perception corruption variable) 
and Table 5 (Amount corruption variable). We observe the coefficient for Corruption 
is negative in estimations explaining loans to households and loans to firms, with a 
significant sign in most cases. This indicates corruption hampers bank lending to 
households  and to firms.  The most striking finding here concerns the positive 
coefficient for Corruption in estimations explaining loans to government, which is 
significant in most cases. It suggests corruption favors bank lending to government, 
and is thus not detrimental for all borrowers. As mentioned above, lower information 
asymmetries when lending to government entities may explain why these borrowers 
are less affected by corruption, but  it  does not explain the positive impact.  One 
possibility is that ill-functioning institutions with dishonest civil servants are extorting 
money from banks. In any case, the positive impact of corruption on bank lending to 
government should not be interpreted as a benefit. Unlike bank lending as a whole, 
bank lending to government does not favor economic development. Further,  it is 
reasonable to postulate that increased  bank lending to government entities  diverts 
lending resources away  from  more appropriate borrowers  in terms of economic 
development. 
For the rest, we observe similar results for the control variables in most cases 
with two interesting exceptions. Age  is significantly negative when loans to 
government are explained, suggesting that younger banks grant more loans to 
government.  Moreover, the share of deposits to assets, which was significantly 
negative in our main estimations, is differently connected to each category of loans: 
negatively significant for loans to firms, positively significant for loans to households, 
and not significant for loans to government. As loans to firms represent the majority 
of customer loans (88.76%), our result from the main initial estimations was driven by 
these loans. However, we observe that banks that rely more on deposits tend to lend   - 14 -  - 
 
 
more loans to households. This is an intuitive result, as these banks are expected to 
have more households in their client base. 
 
V.4 Robustness checks 
Having tested the robustness of this result to alternative measures of corruption 
and different sets of control variables, we now check the robustness of this finding in 
other ways. 
We  use an alternative variable to measure the extent to which banks grant 
credit: the share of loans in total assets. This considers the importance of lending in 
the activities of the bank, and takes the size of the bank into account. The estimations 
are given in Table 6. Note that the coefficient of Corruption remains significantly 
negative while the control variables are unaffected. 
Another potential distortion in the results could come from the fact that about 
half of the banks surveyed were located in the Moscow region and thus makes the 
level of corruption in the Moscow region determinative. We revise our estimations by 
considering only banks outside the Moscow region to check whether our findings are 
preserved. Results presented in Table 7 show that the detrimental effect of corruption 
on bank lending is not affected by the restriction of the sample to non-Moscow banks, 
as  Corruption  remains  significantly  negative. We observe that the coefficients of 
control variables are slightly affected with notably a non-significant coefficient for 
foreign ownership, which can be explained by the small number of foreign banks 
outside the Moscow region. 
 
VI. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we examined the role of corruption on bank lending in Russia 
using regional data for corruption and bank-level data for lending. Overall, we found 
corruption diminishes bank lending. Further, the detrimental effect is not weakened 
when  the  risk aversion  of banks is taken into account. Estimations by type of 
borrowers showed that corruption favors lending to government entities over lending 
to households and firms. This latter finding is not necessarily good news as it may 
indicate institutional susceptibility to public pressure to grant bank loans and divert 
bank lending away from more appropriate and economically beneficial uses.   - 15 -  - 
 
 
Our  overall  conclusion is that corruption is detrimental to  bank lending in 
Russia. Corruption adds to uncertainty for banks; it reduces their trust in courts and 
acts as tax on loans for borrowers. These findings provide a better understanding of 
the causes of Russia’s  financial underdevelopment and the consequences of 
corruption. As bank credit has generally been shown to favor growth, these results 
should give Russian officials an economic incentive to fight corruption actively rather 
than give in to the widely held view that economic growth in itself will lead to lower 
corruption levels. 
Our analysis could be extended in a number of ways. For example, information 
on the connections between banks and borrowers could, in the line of Khwaja and 
Mian (2005), be gathered to investigate the presence of connected lending in Russia. 
Studies could also be performed for other countries to establish whether the effects of 
corruption on bank lending are not exclusive to Russia. 
Future corruption  trends in Russia  are,  of course,  hard to predict.  On the 
optimistic side, Shleifer and Treisman (2000, 2004) do not find corruption in Russia a 
specific characteristic of this “normal country,” giving hope that corruption will soon 
begin to diminish, even if the trend severely lags economic development. INDEM 
experts make the more pessimistic assertion that “Russia needs 40 years of meticulous 
work to reach the corruption level in Portugal or 100 years to come up with corruption 
statistics in Sweden”  (Kommersant,  October 31, 2006).  Sadly,  recent  evidence of 
enduring high levels of corruption in this fast-growing country and polls showing a 
large proportion of Russians still consider  various forms of bribery as morally 
acceptable (e.g. 2006 Gallup poll mentioned by Gradirovski and Esipova, 2006) tend 
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Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
Means and standard deviations for variables used in subsequent estimations. Sources: TI/INDEM survey for 
Perception and Amount; Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) for Per Capita Income; own computations 
with Interfax database for Bank Concentration; and Interfax database for all bank-level variables. 
 
 
Variable  Description  N  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Perception  Integral index for the perception of 
corruption from 0 (least corrupt) to 1 (most 
corrupt) 
3,825  0.6241  0.1429 
Amount  Integral index for the amount of corruption 
from 0 (least corrupt) to 1 (most corrupt) 
3,825  0.7213  0.2601 
Loans  Logarithm of total customer loans, i.e. the 
sum of loans to households, firms, and 
government (in millions of rubles) 
3,825  5.1038  1.8723 
Loans to Assets 
 
Ratio of loans to total assets  3,825  0.5203  0.2092 
Risk Aversion  Difference between the capital adequacy 
ratio (N1) and the minimum required ratio 
3,825  29.29  23.41 
Size 
 
Logarithm of total assets (in millions of 
rubles) 
3,825  5.9039  1.7221 
Deposits to Assets 
 
Ratio of deposits to total assets  3,825  0.5698  0.2068 
Age 
 
Age (in quarters)  3,825  37.72  9.45 
Public  Dummy variable; equals one if the bank is 
publicly-owned 
3,825  0.0167  0.1283 
Foreign  Dummy variable; equals one if the bank is 
foreign-owned 
3,825  0.0238  0.1524 
Bank Concentration  Herfindahl index of regional bank 
concentration for loans 
3,825  0.1411  0.1692 
Per Capita Income  Gross regional product per capita (in 
thousands of rubles) 
3,825  11.5304  0.6546 
Loans to Households  Logarithm of loans to households (in 
millions of rubles) 
3,573  2.0847  1.9656 
Loans to Firms  Logarithm of loans to firms (in millions of 
rubles) 
3,809  4.9752  1.9474 
Loans to Government  Logarithm of loans to government (in 
millions of rubles) 
694  1.9199  2.8126 
 







OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Loans. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. Table 
reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different 
from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters are included in the regressions, but 
not reported here. 
 
 
  Corruption variable 
Explanatory variables  Perception  Amount 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 




























































-  0.068 
(0.62) 




-  -0.141*** 
(5.54) 
Adjusted R²  0.8618  0.8653  0.8636  0.8653 









Estimations with Risk Aversion variable 
 
 
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Loans. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. Table 
reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different 
from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters are included in the regressions, but 
not reported here. 
 
 
  Corruption variable 
Explanatory variables  Perception  Amount 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 












































































-  0.154 
(1.44) 




-  -0.110*** 
(4.43) 
Adjusted R²  0.8702  0.8724  0.8710  0.8724 









Estimations by category of loans with Perception variable 
 
 
OLS regressions. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics 
in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
Dummy variables for quarters are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
 
  Dependent Variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Loans to Households  Loans to Firms  Loans to Government 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
























































































-  0.166 
(1.56) 
-  -0.475 
(0.72) 




-  -0.161* 
(5.85) 
-  -0.799*** 
(4.29) 
Adjusted R²  0.4195  0.4202  0.8586  0.8618  0.3127  0.3313 
N  3573  3573  3809  3809  694  694 
 




Estimations by category of loans with Amount variable 
 
 
OLS regressions. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics 
in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
Dummy variables for quarters are included in the regressions but are not reported. 
 
 
  Dependent Variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
Loans to Households  Loans to Firms  Loans to Government 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
























































































-  0.117 
(1.01) 
-  0.529 
(0.74) 




-  -0.134*** 
(5.01) 
-  -0.806*** 
(4.59) 
Adjusted R²  0.4183  0.4201  0.8601  0.8617  0.3143  0.3418 
N  3573  3573  3809  3809  694  694 
 
 




Robustness Check: Alternative measure of bank lending 
 
 
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Loans to Assets. Definitions of variables appear in table 1. 
Table reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly 
different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters are included in the 
regressions, but not reported here. 
 
 
  Corruption variable 































































Bank Concentration  -  0.022 
(0.75) 
-  -0.002 
(0.05) 
Per Capita Income  -  -0.049*** 
(6.64) 
-  -0.040*** 
(5.47) 
Adjusted R²  0.1048  0.1261  0.1163  0.1256 
N  3825  3825  3825  3825 
 




Robustness check: Estimations for non-Moscow banks 
 
 
OLS regressions. The dependent variable is Loans. Definitions of variables appear in Table 1. Table 
reports coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different 
from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for quarters are included in the regressions, but 
not reported here. 
 
 
  Corruption variable 
Explanatory variables  Perception  Amount 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
























































Bank Concentration  -  0.069 
(1.00) 
-  0.063 
(0.85) 
Per Capita Income  -  0.006 
(0.18) 
-  0.026 
(0.75) 
Adjusted R²  0.9277  0.9277  0.9274  0.9273 
N  1617  1617  1617  1617 
 






Measures of corruption by region 
 




Region  Index for Perception  Index for Amount 
Altai Krai  0.551  0.721 
Amur Oblast  0.633  0.299 
Arkhangelsk Oblast  0.128  0.068 
Bashkortostan  0.000  0.114 
Belgorod Oblast  0.435  0.403 
Chelyabinsk Oblast  0.556  0.853 
Karelia  0.864  0.000 
Kemerovo Oblast  0.269  0.664 
Khabarovsk Krai  0.644  0.782 
Krasnodar Krai  1.000  0.681 
Krasnoyarsk Krai  0.331  0.117 
Kurgansk Oblast  0.658  0.253 
Leningrad Oblast  0.530  0.340 
Moscow  0.634  0.864 
Moscow Oblast  0.754  1.000 
Nizhny Novgorod Oblast  0.712  0.929 
Novgorod Oblast  0.658  0.181 
Novosibirsk Oblast  0.643  0.275 
Omsk Oblast  0.542  0.074 
Perm Oblast  0.470  0.115 
Primorski Krai  0.868  0.201 
Pskov Oblast  0.595  0.542 
Rostov Oblast  0.747  0.753 
Ryazan Oblast  0.558  0.395 
Samara Oblast  0.731  0.200 
Saratov Oblast  0.913  0.867 
St. Petersburg  0.412  0.843 
Stavropol Krai  0.707  0.501 
Sverdlovsk Oblast  0.582  0.683 
Tambov Oblast  0.489  0.580 
Tatarstan  0.658  0.245 
Tula Oblast  0.486  0.554 
Tumen Oblast  0.283  0.033 
Tver Oblast  0.629  0.160 
Udmurtia  0.872  0.333 
Ulyanovsk Oblast  0.580  0.552 
Volgograd Oblast  0.803  0.801 
Voronezh Oblast  0.626  0.390 
Yaroslavl Oblast  0.295  0.010 
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